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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965 will be fifty years
old. In those fifty years, at least seventy-three urban renewal districts in
twenty-five of Idaho’s forty-four counties have sprung up across the
state of Idaho.1 In spite of urban renewal’s longevity and proliferation in
Idaho, it continues to face opposition in the state.2 Yet, when compared
to other states, Idaho’s urban renewal laws have always been fairly restrictive of the practice.3 Furthermore, in the fifty years since its inception, the Idaho legislature has changed and, arguably, improved the way
that urban renewal is implemented in the state. Despite these improvements, the implementation of Idaho’s urban renewal laws could
benefit from minor changes.
Part I of this article explains what urban renewal is, examines its
history, posits that aversion to urban renewal is partly due to a turbulent history that misbranded it, describes what tax increment financing
(TIF) is, and explains how TIF became an integral part of urban renewal. Part II examines the legality of urban renewal and TIF in Idaho,
demonstrates how the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled on most of the
major legal objections to urban renewal, and predicts how that court
would decide unaddressed legal issues relating to urban renewal in Idaho. Part III explains that TIF is simultaneously successful and controversial because of inherent aspects of TIF that closely map features of
contemporary local government, surveys TIF successes and failures in
Idaho, shows the conservative beginnings of Idaho’s TIF laws, displays

1. E-mail and spreadsheet from Gary Houde, Senior Research Analyst, Idaho
State Tax Commission, to author (April 18, 2014, 05:09 PST) (on file with author).
2. See, e.g., Randal O’Toole, Theft as Urban Renewal: Why Idaho Should Repeal
the Local Economic Development Act, IDAHO FREEDOM FOUND. (Feb. 2011),
http://idahofreedom.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Theft-as-Urban-Renewal-Feb-2011.pdf.
3. Compare Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. Kriz, A Review of Tax Increment Financing Laws, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15, 33–35, 45–
47 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001) (comparing urban renewal and TIF laws in
the United States) with infra Part V (tracking the history of Idaho’s urban renewal statutes).
See infra Part III.
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how those laws have evolved to create more government accountability
for TIF projects, and suggests minor changes that could improve TIF in
Idaho. After the conclusion in part IV, a table in part V tracks the history and evolution of Idaho’s urban renewal and TIF statutes.
A. What are Urban Renewal and Tax Increment Financing?
Black’s Law Dictionary explains that urban renewal is “[t]he process of redeveloping urban areas by demolishing or repairing existing
structures or by building new facilities on areas that that have been
cleared in accordance with an overall plan.” 4 Urban renewal generally
requires that an area be blighted in order for it to be eligible for renewal,5 though this requirement has been significantly relaxed.6 Urban renewal goes by various names throughout the country. In California, urban renewal is known as redevelopment.7 Some progressive states and
municipalities recognize the relaxation of blight requirements and simply label urban renewal economic development or development. 8 Whatever its label, urban renewal has been a source of controversy and criticism throughout the United States. 9
Critics of urban renewal come from both ends of the political spectrum. In California, much of the criticism of urban renewal comes from
the left.10 One of the most prominent liberal critics of urban renewal is
California Governor Jerry Brown.11 Brown eliminated California’s urban
renewal program in 2012 as an austerity measure to “try and shock voters into approving new revenues.”12 Much of the criticism of urban renewal in Idaho comes from the far right. 13 These highly conservative
critics and local leaders claim that urban renewal spends public funds
without voter accountability, robs governmental entities of tax revenues,
and does not provide significant public benefits. 14 These criticisms are

4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1680 (9th ed., 2011).
5. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(a) (2009 & Supp. 2013) (requiring an area to be
a “deteriorated area” before it is eligible for urban renewal).
6. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 71 (2010).
7. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33000 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 11 of
2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot).
8. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 71; Nampa Development Corporation, THE CITY
OF NAMPA, http://www.cityofnampa.us/index.aspx?NID=100 (last visited May 22, 2014).
9. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 66.
10. See Robert Cruickshank, Governor Brown’s Progressive Shock Doctrine Takes
Shape, CALITICS (Jan. 4, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.calitics.com/diary/12999/governorbrowns-progressive-shock-doctrine-takes-shape.
11. Id.
12. Id.; Dan Walters, Dan Walters: Political Struggle Looms over Redevelopment’s
Revival,
CAL.
REDEV.
ASS’N.
(Jan.
13,
2014),
http://www.calredevelop.org/wcnews/newsarticledisplay.aspx?ArticleID=49.
13. See generally O’Toole, supra note 2.
14. See id; John Funk, Nampa Council Discusses Future of NDC Board, IDAHO
PRESS-TRIB., Jan. 26, 2014, http://www.idahopress.com/members/nampa-council-discusses-
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largely addressed in parts II and III. Some criticisms of urban renewal
are based on negative associations with historical aspects of urban renewal that are basically nonexistent in modern contexts. 15 Thus, an understanding of urban renewal’s history adds complexity and meaning to
the way it is viewed today.
i. The History and Misbranding of Urban Renewal
Federal urban renewal was first codified in Title I of the Housing
Act of 1949.16 Title I promised large-scale revitalization of American cities through federal funding.17 It purported to offer the kind of overarching redevelopment scheme that only the federal government could supply.18 To better utilize the federal funds that flowed from Title I, Idaho
passed the Idaho Urban Renewal Act of 1965.19 The Idaho Urban Renewal Act of 1965 authorized Idaho municipalities to define urban renewal districts20 and use federal funds to improve blighted and deteriorated areas within those districts.21
Despite nationwide state passage of urban renewal acts similar to
the Idaho Urban Renewal Act of 1965, 22 support for federal urban renewal waned during the 1960s and 1970s. 23 Critics felt that Title I’s
“ambiguous and ill-defined” goals created uncertainty about how it
should be implemented. 24 Further, federal urban renewal encouraged
the use of eminent domain to obtain title to massive urban areas to be

future-of-ndc-board/article_73acff70-8334-11e3-8e49-001a4bcf887a.html [hereinafter Nampa
Council Discusses Future of NDC Board].
15. See, e.g., infra Part I.A.i.
16. See Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE
443, 443 (2000), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/showdoc.html?id=2092.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN., ET AL., TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: FISCAL
IMPACT OF THE BOISE CENTRAL URBAN RENEWAL DISTRICT 3 (2002) [hereinafter FISCAL
IMPACT] (on file with author); John T. Reuter, Razed & Confused: Boise’s Turbulent History
of
Urban
Renewal,
BOISE
WEEKLY,
Aug.
4,
2010,
available
at
http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/razed-and-confused-boises-turbulent-history-of-urbanrenewal/Content?oid=1713334.
20. See generally Idaho Code Ann. § 50-2001–33 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
21. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2007(k) (2009 & Supp. 2013); FISCAL IMPACT, supra
note 19, at 3; Reuter, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33000 (West, Westlaw through
2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.330 (West,
Westlaw through 2014 2nd Reg. Sess., March 31, 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.1 (West,
Westlaw through legislation signed as of 4/11/2014 from the 2014 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 279.382 (West, Westlaw through 2013 77th Reg. Sess. and the 27th Special
Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-31-1 (West, Westlaw through chapter 534 of the 2013 Reg.
Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Reg. Sess.);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.81.005 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation).
23. See Teaford, supra note 16, at 454.
24. Id. at 445.
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cleared for redevelopment. 25 After these areas were taken, they were
often occupied by private entities in order to spur economic development.26 Federal urban renewal also had little regard for historically significant buildings, which, because of the age of such buildings, often fell
neatly into definitions of blight. 27 Finally, and perhaps most damning,
Title I “modified the programs set up under the 1937 Housing Act by
conditioning funding for slum clearance projects on affording ‘maximum
opportunity’ to private developers and by allowing slum areas to be redeveloped with other than low income housing.” 28 This meant that many
low-income urban residents, which were predominantly racial minorities, were forced out of their housing.29 Such effects quickly found disfavor among private property owners,30 historical preservationists,31 and
civil rights advocates.32 The United States Supreme Court upheld and
perpetuated federal urban renewal and its effects as part of the police
power with its decision in Berman v. Parker.33 The Berman Court stated, “It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” 34 Ultimately, however,
Congress decreased the scale of and funding for federal urban renewal
by integrating it into the Great Society’s Model Cities scheme in 1974.35
Even though eminent domain is rarely used for urban renewal in
modern contexts, urban renewal continues to carry the stigma of eminent domain in Idaho.36 The United States Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, which allowed local governments to
use eminent domain for economic development purposes,37 exacerbated
25. See Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URBAN
LAWYER 423, 437–38 (2010).
26. See generally Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 578, 94
Idaho 876, 879 (1972) (stating the redevelopment agency’s plan was “to clear the area and
thereafter permit private enterprise, on a bid basis, to construct and occupy certain of the
buildings planned for the area”).
27. George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 61 (2008).
28. Lavine, supra note 25, at 472, 442.
29. Id. at 424.
30. See Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d at 577, 94 Idaho at 878. The plaintiffs in Yick
Kong claimed that a taking that incidentally benefitted private developers was not a public
use. Id.
31. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 61; Reuter, supra note 19.
32. Lavine, supra note 25, at 472.
33. See Lavine, supra note 25, at 423–24.
34. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
35. Teaford, supra note 16, at 459.
36. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A (2009 & Supp. 2013). This section was passed in
direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Kelo. Kimberly M. Watt, Eminent Domain,
Regulatory Takings, and Legislative Responses in the Post-Kelo Northwest, 43 IDAHO L. REV.
539, 539 (2007).
37. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005); Watt, supra note
36, at 539.
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critics’ disfavor for urban renewal.38 Polls taken at the time of the decision indicated that over 90% of Americans disagreed with the opinion
and 67% of registered voters wanted to limit the power of eminent domain.39 Idaho was not exempt from this unpopular view of Kelo. In direct response to Kelo, the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code section
7-701A in 2006 “to provide limitations on eminent domain for private
parties, urban renewal or economic development purposes.” 40 Because of
urban renewal’s connection with economic development and history of
using eminent domain, critics of urban renewal continue to associate it
with eminent domain and the negative stigma of the Kelo ruling. However, eminent domain has become a relatively underutilized process for
obtaining property for urban renewal in Idaho.41 In a 2010 Boise Weekly
article, Phil Kushlan, then executive director of Boise’s urban renewal
agency, said, “in the old days we used eminent domain a lot, and we
haven't used it since 1980.”42 Although limitations such as Idaho Code
section 7-701A likely contribute to this underutilization, it is more likely
due to the administrative and political burdens of pushing an eminent
domain proceeding through the public hearings required for urban renewal.43 Regardless, though eminent domain is still available to urban
renewal agencies (URAs), negatively associating urban renewal with
eminent domain does not make sense in Idaho where URAs rarely use
eminent domain.
Critics also continue to associate urban renewal with the destruction of historical buildings.44 Indeed, in the heyday of federal urban renewal and “large-scale, federally funded clearance projects” this was a
warranted association. 45 In Idaho, Boise fell subject to this “heavyhanded” style of urban renewal.46 In the 1970s, Boise’s URA tore down
Boise’s Chinatown and attempted to demolish several historical buildings. 47 However, as federal urban renewal wound down, historical
preservation became popular and federal tax laws were adjusted to favor rehabilitation of aged buildings. 48 In Boise, former Boise Mayor Dirk
Kempthorne spearheaded locating the Boise Town Square Mall four
miles outside of downtown instead of in the place of several historical
38. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A (2009 & Supp. 2013); Ilya Somin, The Limits of
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
39. Watt, supra note 36, at 539.
40. H.R. 555, 58th Leg., 2nd Sess., Statement of Purpose (Idaho 2006).
41. Telephone Interview with Melinda Anderson, Economic Development Director,
City of Twin Falls, Idaho (Mar. 3, 2014) (notes on file with author); Telephone Interview with
Ryan P. Armbruster, Shareholder, Elam & Burke, & Meghan S. Conrad, Associate, Elam &
Burke (Feb. 27, 2014) (notes on file with author).
42. Reuter, supra note 19.
43. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 80–81
44. O’Toole, supra note 2; Reuter, supra note 19.
45. Teaford, supra note 16, at 461.
46. Reuter, supra note 19.
47. Id.
48. Teaford, supra note 16, at 461.

WHAT’S THE TIFF ABOUT TIF?

2014]

279

downtown buildings and encouraged renovation instead of destruction;49
this changed the attitude of urban renewal in Boise. According to Boise
Weekly, “[U]rban renewal in Boise has treated the city's history with
respect and has restored almost as much of the city as it decimated in
the 1970s.”50 Boise’s URA now focuses on “supporting the reuse of historic buildings and re-creating traditional downtown streetscapes.” 51
Indeed, the Boise URA and Idaho URAs in general now encourage historical preservation rather than destruction. Considering this rolereversal, associating urban renewal with the destruction of historical
buildings is not rational.
Though perhaps not as much as states with large populations of racial minorities, Idaho also experienced the racially discriminatory effects
of federal urban renewal. As already mentioned, Boise’s URA decimated
Boise’s Chinatown, “destroying not just buildings, but what remained of
a community, too.”52 Congress’s passage of the Widnall Amendment to
the Housing Act in 1966 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 helped limit
the discriminatory effects of federal urban renewal.53 Local governments
have also sought to mitigate the discriminatory impacts of modern urban renewal.54 Contemporary “state and local governments are . . . more
aware of the discriminatory impacts of redevelopment than they were . .
. [and] have taken steps to improve the fairness of the redevelopment
process by making it more transparent and by improving relocation assistance programs.”55 Despite these changes, many critics believe that
urban renewal still imposes disproportionate burdens on poor communities and minorities.56 However, if used correctly, urban renewal need not
bear this stigma. When urban renewal is used without the power of eminent domain, as in Idaho, the burdens it imposes on poor and minority
communities are drastically reduced if not eliminated.57
ii. The Emergence and Proliferation of Tax Increment Financing
With less federal funding after federal urban renewal was eliminated in the 1970s, states were forced to independently fund their urban
renewal projects.58 Many states turned to tax abatements, incentive zoning, and direct grants.59 In California, where bonds for urban renewal
required hard-to-obtain voter approval, local governments began using
tax increment financing as a way to provide more funding for urban re49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Reuter, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Lavine, supra note 25, at 472.
See id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 473–74.
See id. at 475.
Teaford, supra note 16, at 460.
Id.
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newal. 60 Initially, TIF grew slowly; in the late 1970s there were just
twenty-six TIF areas in California and six other states where TIF was
authorized.61 But between 1980 and 1990, the number of TIF areas in
California more than doubled, increasing from 299 to 658. 62 Twentyeight other states had authorized TIF by 1984.63 This number increased
to thirty-three by 1987 and forty-four by 1992.64 Today, TIF is authorized in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.65 By far, TIF has
become the most widespread urban renewal financing mechanism in the
country. 66 Idaho adopted TIF in 1988 with the passage of The Local
Economic Development Act.67
Studies suggest there are many thousands of TIF districts nationwide.68 In 2003, Wisconsin had 789 TIF districts, Missouri had at least
291 TIF districts in 2007, and Iowa had a staggering 2,400 TIF districts
“covering 7.1[%] of the urban tax base” in 1999.69 California had upward
of 10% of its property tax base included in a TIF district in 2001. 70 In
Idaho, 3.9% of property taxes went to Idaho URAs statewide in 2009. 71
In 2013, there were seventy-three urban renewal districts in twenty-five
of Idaho’s forty-four counties.72
The proliferation of TIF has paralleled the evolution of urban renewal.73 As TIF became the most widely used financing tool for urban
renewal, urban renewal evolved to allow local governments to develop
unblighted areas.74 As previously mentioned, urban renewal came to be
used not only to redevelop dilapidated, deteriorated areas, but also to
develop unblighted areas.75 To accommodate the evolution of urban renewal, state legislatures have relaxed definitions of blight. 76 As state
courts have largely deferred to legislatures’ proffered definitions of
blight, findings of blight have become merely a formality. 77 Sixteen
states have abolished the need for a blight finding altogether. 78 TIF is a
60. Briffault, supra note 6, at 69.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 70.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. California repealed its TIF statute in 2012. Walters, supra note 12. Arizona
is the other state without a TIF program. Briffault, supra note 6, at 70. To the knowledge of
the author, no other states have repealed or enacted TIF statutes since Richard Briffault
published this article in 2010.
66. Teaford, supra note 16, at 460.
67. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2901 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
68. Briffault, supra note 6, at 70.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. O’Toole, supra note 2.
72. E-mail and spreadsheet from Gary Houde, supra note 1.
73. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 71.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 71–72.
78. Id.
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major reason for this evolution. While TIF can work in blighted areas, it
is most effective in unblighted areas.79
TIF’s prevalence not only demonstrates its suitability to local economic development, but also its place as a necessary tool for municipalities.80 Without federal funding from Title I, states needed a way to finance urban renewal and economic development.81 TIF filled that void.82
Idaho cities almost exclusively use TIF to finance urban renewal.83 In
Idaho, TIF laws are intertwined with urban renewal laws. Definitions
and procedures from Idaho’s urban renewal laws are incorporated into
Idaho’s TIF laws.84 The remainder of this article will focus mostly on
TIF. However, because TIF is almost exclusively used for urban renewal
in Idaho,85 when this article refers to the use of TIF, it will also be referencing the practice of urban renewal and vice versa.
iii. The Basic Structure of Tax Increment Financing
TIF begins with the creation of an urban renewal agency. 86 The
agency then forms TIF districts where TIF funds will be allocated. 87
Once an agency forms a district, the property tax value within the district is assessed and set.88 The assessed value is the set base value.89
Property taxes in the district are levied as usual, and the set base value
continues to go to the various taxing entities, such as municipalities,
counties, school districts, and fire districts. 90 As property tax values
within the TIF district increase, the agency receives any property tax
revenues that exceed the set base value and uses them to make improvements to the TIF district.91 These excess revenues are the increment in tax increment financing. Improvements include the construction of public facilities, infrastructure, or other economic development.92
Urban renewal agencies can implement TIF by paying for improvements
as the TIF district produces increment or by leveraging bonds that are
used to fund improvements. 93 In the latter situation, the improvements
increase property tax revenues, the increment of which is used to repay
79.
80.

Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 67–73.
J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 15.
81. Teaford, supra note 16, at 460.
82. See id.
83. Telephone Interview with Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41.
84. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2903(2), (8)(c), (12), -2906(1), (3), -2909(1)(c),
(3) (2009 & Supp. 2013) (referencing the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965).
85. Telephone Interview Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41.
86. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(a) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
87. Briffault, supra note 6, at 67.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 67–68.
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the bonds.94 TIF bonds thus allow municipalities to “jumpstart the redevelopment process.”95 As bonds or project costs are paid off, the project is
wound down and incremental revenues are eventually returned to the
taxing entities.96
Broadly speaking, TIF can be divided into five phases.97 The first
phase is the project initiation phase. During this phase, a city identifies
an area as blighted or underdeveloped and forms an urban renewal
agency to address the problem. 98 The second phase is the plan formulation phase. In this phase, the urban renewal agency forms a TIF plan
that sets out the municipality’s blight finding, the urban renewal area,
and other aspects important to the community and the success of the
project.99 The third phase is the plan adoption phase. During this phase,
the urban renewal agency subjects the plan to various participatory
mechanisms that allow the public and affected taxing entities to become
familiar with and object to the TIF plan.100 If the plan is adopted at the
plan adoption phase, it is then implemented. The plan implementation
phase is the fourth phase and includes property value assessment, tax
increment allocation to the urban renewal agency, and physical plan
execution.101 As the plan is implemented, “it should be subject to evaluation and set to terminate within a specified time.” 102 This is the fifth and
final TIF phase: evaluation and termination. Throughout all phases of
the project, agencies should operate transparently.
After part II discusses the legality of TIF, part III examines the
status of Idaho’s TIF laws and improvements the Idaho legislature could
make to these laws in relation to each of the project phases. 103
II. THE LEGALITY OF URBAN RENEWAL AND TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING
Because urban renewal is implemented on a state-by-state basis, it
is subject to state constitutional and statutory restrictions. Accordingly,
urban renewal opponents have sought to undermine urban renewal’s
legality by arguing that it violates certain state constitutional and statutory restrictions.104 While these arguments are used against TIF today,
they are generally the same arguments used against the revenue bonds
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 16.
97. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 32.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. A table showing the project phases and the way that different elements of each
phase is and has been addressed in Idaho is available in the appendix. Infra Part V.
104. See Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 579–83, 94 Idaho
876, 880–84 (1972).
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that funded urban renewal before TIF existed (with the exception of the
argument that TIF is often not the “but for” causation of development).105 Thus, while one of the cases discussed in this section refers to
revenue bonds, the arguments made against revenue bonds are equally
applicable to TIF. These arguments assert that urban renewal violates
constitutional restrictions and principles of statutory construction. 106
While the Idaho Supreme Court has not ruled on all of these arguments,
this section explains how it has ruled on some of them and seeks to predict how it might rule on others.
A. Constitutional Restrictions
Most of the constitutional arguments against TIF stem from constitutional limits on public spending, such as restrictions on municipalities’ ability to incur debt and requirements that expenditure of municipal funds be limited to public purposes. These limits on public spending
originated in the 1830s when states sought to replicate the success the
Erie Canal had in stimulating New York’s economy by sponsoring massive amounts of state-funded infrastructure development.107 Large-scale
projects such as “turnpikes, canals, and railroads” sprang up all over the
country.108 Unfortunately, many private developers were unable to repay the money borrowed from states to make these improvements.109
The states in turn had trouble repaying their debtors and several defaulted on their loans.110 As a result, many states revised their constitutions to prevent municipalities from incurring debt without voter approval111 and to require that funds must be spent in furtherance of a
public purpose.112
i. Restraints on Cities’ Ability to Incur Indebtedness without Voter
Approval
Much of the controversy over TIF stems from the fact that TIF
bonds are usually entered into without voter approval. 113 Whether TIF
bonds require voter approval depends on whether they are more like
revenue bonds or general obligation bonds.114 Revenue bonds are repaid
solely by funds produced by a specified revenue-generating source associated with the bonds.115 Similarly, TIF bonds are repaid by incremental
105. See id.; Briffault, supra note 6, at 74–81.
106. See Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d at 580, 94 Idaho at 881.
107. Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits
and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 911 (2003) [hereinafter Forward].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 917.
112. Id. at 911–12.
113. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 76–77.
114. See id.
115. Id.
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increases in property tax revenues that come from revenue-generating
sources in a specific area associated with the bonds. 116 General obligation bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the city and repaid
from the city’s treasury.117 TIF bonds are similar to general obligation
bonds because TIF bonds are repaid using money that would otherwise
go to the city treasury.118 Through judicial interpretation and constitutional amendment, revenue bonds have generally been found to be exempt from constitutional limitations on incurring debt without voter
approval.119 Thus, if TIF bonds are more like revenue bonds, they may
be exempt from constitutional restrictions on incurring debt without
voter approval.120 However, if TIF bonds are more like general obligation bonds, they likely violate such restrictions if they are used without
voter approval.121 In states that have no laws exempting TIF bonds from
state constitutional restrictions on incurring debt, courts have split over
whether TIF bonds are akin to revenue bonds or general obligation
bonds.122 However, most states avoid interpreting whether they should
treat TIF bonds as though they are revenue bonds or general obligation
bonds by exempting TIF bonds themselves from state constitutional restraints on incurring debt without voter approval.123 This can be accomplished by judicial or legislative declaration that urban renewal agencies, as authorities independent of municipalities, are not subject to debt
limits.124
The Idaho Supreme Court made such a declaration in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp.125 There, the Boise Redevelopment
Agency (BRA) sought to purchase property from the Yick Kong Corporation for the purpose of urban renewal. 126 Negotiations between the two
parties broke down, and the BRA pursued condemnation of the property.127 The trial court granted the BRA’s condemnation of the property. 128
The Yick Kong Corporation appealed, claiming that the revenue bonds
(this case was decided before Idaho used TIF) the BRA used to finance
its projects were invalid because article VIII, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution prevents cities from incurring debt without taxpayer approval.129
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
(1972).
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Forward, supra note 107, at 913, 918.
See Briffault, supra note 6, at 76.
See id.
Id.
Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 44.
Id. at 47. Minnesota has made such a declaration. Id.
Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 581, 94 Idaho 876, 882
Id. at 577, 94 Idaho at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 579–80.
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The Yick Kong Corporation asserted that the BRA was the alter
ego of the city and was therefore subject to the same constitutional restrictions on incurring debt that the city was, and that, by issuing revenue bonds, the BRA—and thus the city—had violated article VIII, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution.130 The Yick Kong Corporation based
this assertion on the city’s ability to appoint and remove agency commissioners and approve and deny agency projects.131 The Idaho Supreme
Court dismissed these arguments, noting that (1) the city’s ability to
appoint and remove commissioners was not absolute and thus did not
confer excessive control and (2) the city’s ability to approve and deny
projects was necessary to provide a local voice in the BRA’s operations.132 The court concluded that the URA was not “the alter ego of the
City of Boise,” that “[t]he degree of control exercised by the City of Boise
[did] not usurp the powers and duties of the [BRA],” and that “the close
association between the two entities at most show[ed] two independent
public entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes.” 133
In 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the Yick Kong holding in Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg v. Hart.134 In Hart,
the City of Rexburg’s urban renewal agency planned to use TIF bonds to
construct a public outdoor swimming facility, a sporting and community
events building, and outdoor fields.135 Kenneth Hart, a Rexburg citizen
filing a pro se appearance, challenged the constitutionality of the TIF
bonds.136 Hart made the same argument as the Yick Kong Corporation—
that urban renewal agencies are the alter egos of cities and are therefore subject to the same state constitutional limits on incurring debt
without voter approval as cities.137 Hart claimed that the Rexburg URA,
as the alter ego of the city, could not issue TIF bonds to finance its project because such financing would amount to the city incurring debt
without voter approval.138
Hart further argued that two amendments to the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965 made subsequent to Yick Kong validated the alterego argument.139 The first of these amendments allowed a city to appoint itself as its own urban renewal agency board both at the outset of
the URA’s formation and by terminating an existing board. 140 The second amendment removed language that prevented a URA board member from holding any other public office in the municipality of the
130. Id.
131. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d at 580, 94 Idaho at 881.
132. Id. at 581, 94 Idaho at 882.
133. Id.
134. Urban Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 222 P.3d 467, 471, 148 Idaho
299, 303 (2009).
135. Id. at 468, 148 Idaho at 300.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 469–70, 148 Idaho at 301–02.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 470, 148 Idaho at 302.
140. Hart, 222 P.3d at 470, 148 Idaho at 302.
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URA.141 Hart claimed that these amendments increased the amount of
control cities exercised over URAs, thus making URAs the alter egos of
cities.142
The trial court found that the TIF bonds were constitutional. 143
Hart appealed the ruling and nine other Idaho URAs filed a brief as
amici curiae, asking the Idaho Supreme Court to affirm the trial court’s
holding.144 The Idaho Supreme Court maintained that URAs are not the
alter egos of cities.145 The court noted that the amendments did not increase cities’ control over URAs:
[E]ven if the city governing body does appoint itself, the commissioners [including those who hold other public offices in the
URA’s municipality] “shall, in all respects when acting as an urban renewal agency, be acting as an arm of state government,
entirely separate and distinct from the municipality, to achieve,
perform and accomplish the public purposes prescribed and provided by said urban renewal law of 1965.”146
The court held, “Even as amended, the Law does not allow a city to
usurp the powers and duties of the urban renewal agency.” 147
The holdings in Yick Kong and Hart thus make it clear that the
Idaho Supreme Court does not think that urban renewal and TIF violate
constitutional restraints on cities’ ability to incur indebtedness without
voter approval.
ii. Restraints Limiting Expenditure of Tax Dollars to Public Purposes
State courts strictly interpreted what constituted a public purpose
for the expenditure of tax dollars from the time public purpose requirements were instituted in the 1830s and 1840s up until the 1930s. 148
With the onset of the Great Depression, however, state courts increasingly upheld programs that issued bonds to catalyze development. 149
These efforts to counteract the effects of the Great Depression led to the
erosion of public purpose requirements.150 By the end of the twentieth
century, nearly all state courts had upheld the constitutionality of one
form or another of funding for private economic development through
revenue bonds.151 Although public purpose restrictions are still preva141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 468, 148 Idaho at 300.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 471, 148 Idaho at 303.
146. Hart, 222 P.3d at 470, 148 Idaho at 302 (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 502006(b)(3) (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
147. Id. at 471, 148 Idaho at 303.
148. Forward, supra note 107, at 911–12.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 913.
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lent today, state courts are very deferential to state legislatures’ definitions of what a public purpose is. 152 This often means that state constitutions’ public purpose restrictions on the expenditure of tax dollars are,
for the most part, ornamental.153
Article VIII, sections 2 and 4, and article 12, section 4 of the Idaho
Constitution contain Idaho’s public purpose requirement.154 The Idaho
Supreme Court also announced a public purpose requirement in Idaho
Water Resource Board v. Kramer, noting that a public purpose is one
“that serves to benefit the community as a whole and which is directly
related to the functions of government.”155 In Yick Kong, the Yick Kong
Corporation also asserted that the City of Boise had violated Idaho’s
public purpose requirement by lending credit to the URA, which it asserted was a private entity.156 The court held that the Boise URA was
engaged in a public purpose.157 The court noted that the URA, “being a
public and not a private enterprise, [did] not fall within the strictures
and prohibition of Article 8, Section 4 and Article 12, Section 4 of the
Idaho Constitution.”158
Additionally, because judicial treatment of what constitutes a public purpose for the expenditure of tax dollars is similar to what constitutes a public use in an eminent domain proceeding, 159 the Yick Kong
court’s discussion of why the taking of property involved in the case was
for a public use is instructive. The court found that the state “may legitimately protect the public from disease, crime, and perhaps even deterioration, blight and ugliness” through urban renewal.160 The court also
found that so long as the benefit that the URA tenders is predominately
public, and private benefit is incidental, urban renewal should be
deemed a public purpose.161 Finally, the court held that economic development is generally incidental to the predominantly public purpose of
urban renewal.162
To take the similarity between what constitutes a public purpose
for the expenditure of tax dollars and what constitutes a public use in
an eminent domain proceeding to its logical end would mean that, after
Kelo, the Idaho Supreme Court could technically announce that urban
renewal that is predominately driven by private economic development
is a public purpose,163 thus allowing for the expenditure of tax dollars.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
(1972).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 914.
Id. at 914–15.
IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, §§ 2, 4; IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 4.
Idaho Water Res. Bd. v. Kramer, 548 P.2d 35, 59, 97 Idaho 535, 559 (1976).
Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 582, 94 Idaho 876, 883
Id. at 581, 583, 94 Idaho at 882, 884.
Id. at 583, 94 Idaho at 884.
Forward, supra note 107, at 946 n. 195.
Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d at 578, 94 Idaho at 879.
Id. at 578–79, 94 Idaho at 879–80.
Id.
See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
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This reasoning is in line with current state interpretations of what constitutes a public purpose for the expenditure of tax dollars.164
B. Statutory Restrictions
While TIF statutory schemes have many restrictions, two restrictions that go to the very core of how and why TIF is used ask
whether the area in which development is proposed is blighted and
whether the proposed development would have occurred without the use
of TIF incentives (a “but for” requirement).165
i. Is the Area Blighted?
Most states’ urban renewal statutes require that there be a finding
of blight before TIF bonds can be used to finance urban renewal. 166
However, state legislatures have redefined and broadened the meaning
of blight to include areas that are more underdeveloped than blighted.167
The definition of blight in Idaho urban renewal and TIF laws has
remained largely the same since the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965
and the Local Economic Development Act of 1987 were enacted. There
are definitions of blight in each of these chapters.168 Both chapters use
the term deteriorated rather than blighted. 169 Idaho Code subsection 502018(8) sets out the specific requirements for an area to be considered
deteriorated for the purposes of urban renewal. 170 This subsection was
amended in 2006 and 2011.171 Idaho Code subsection 50-2903(8) sets out
requirements for an area to be considered deteriorated for the purposes
of a TIF project.172 These requirements are largely the same as those in
subsection 50-2018(8).173 The two subsections are used concurrently174
and the legislature has similarly amended them throughout the
years.175 Because the language in subsection 50-2903(8) is much more
164. Briffault, supra note 6, at 74; Forward, supra note 107, at 945–46.
165. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 77–78.
166. Id. at 78; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
167. Briffault, supra note 6, at 78.
168. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2018(8), -2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
169. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2018(8), -2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
170. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
171. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 4, § 50-2018(8), 2011 Idaho
Sess. Laws 910, 916 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp.
2013)); Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 310, sec. 1, § 50-2018(8), 2006 Idaho Sess.
Laws 953, 953–54 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (Supp. 50-2013)).
172. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
173. Id.; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
174. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2903(2), (8)(c), (12), -2906(1), (3), -2909(1)(c), (3)
(2009 & Supp. 2013) (each of these subsections reference the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of
1965).
175. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 4, § 50-2018(8), 2011 Idaho
Sess. Laws 910, 916 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp.
2013)); Local Economic Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 6, § 50-2903(8), 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws
910, 920 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (both
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current and subsection 50-2903(8) is likely the subsection an urban renewal agency would use when making a blight finding, I will use this
subsection to explain Idaho’s blight requirement.
The broadest sections of 50-2903(8) allow a finding of deterioration
in any area in which there is a
predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot
layout . . . , diversity of ownership, . . . defective or unusual conditions of title, . . . or any combination of such factors [that] results in economic underdevelopment of the area, substantially
impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards
the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health,
safety, morals or welfare in its present condition and use.176
This subsection also specifies that such an area may be an open area. 177 The most significant amendments to subsection 50-2903(8) occurred in 1994 and 2011.178 While the 1994 amendment broadened the
definition of blight, the 2011 amendment narrowed the definition. The
1994 amendment added subsection 50-2908(8)(e), which makes any area
that is economically disadvantaged because of its close proximity to the
border of an adjacent state a deteriorated area. 179 This subsection
broadened the definition of a deteriorated area to include areas that
may not meet any of the definitions of a deteriorated area but are merely economically disadvantaged by virtue of their proximity to a state
border.180 The 2011 amendment sought to limit the definition of a deteriorated area by exempting agricultural and forest land. 181 Although
this amendment technically narrowed the definition of blight, it is unlikely any urban renewal agency would seek to establish an urban renewal district on agricultural or forest land without the land first being
zoned for other purposes.
State courts have encouraged the broadening of blight definitions
by legislatures by largely deferring to legislatures’ definitions of

statutes were changed to exempt agricultural and forest land from the definition of deteriorated); Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 310, sec. 1, § 50-2018(8), 2006 Idaho Sess.
Laws 953, 953–54 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
176. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
177. Id.
178. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 6, § 50-2903(8), 2011 Idaho Sess.
Laws 910, 920 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013));
Local Economic Development Act, ch. 381, sec. 2, § 50-2903(7), 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1222,
1224 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
179. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 381, sec. 2, § 50-2903(7), 1994 Idaho Sess.
Laws 1222, 1224 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
180. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(7) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
181. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 6, § 50-2903(8), 2011 Idaho Sess.
Laws 910, 920 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
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blight.182 Such was the case in Yick Kong183 The Yick Kong Corporation
challenged the finding of blight in the condemned area, where there
were sixty-five buildings, forty-five of which were deemed “defective,”
and seven parcels with no buildings on them. 184 The court held that, because the structures and other improvements in the area were predominately defective, the area was deteriorating. 185 The court’s holding rested largely on deference to the Idaho legislature’s definition of deteriorated.186 The court stated, “The definitions contained in I.C. s[ection] 502018 are, in our view, sufficiently precise to give adequate guidelines to
the local governing body.”187
ii. Would the Development Have Occurred without TIF Subsidies?
Conceptually, TIF would not be a viable source of financing economic development if the development it seeks to attract would have
occurred just as easily without TIF subsidies. 188 Thus, several states
require that TIF plans cannot be approved unless the development
would not have occurred “but for” the TIF subsidies offered to developers.189
An explicit “but for” requirement is absent from Idaho’s TIF and
urban renewal statutes.190 However, Idaho Code section 50-2905(3) requires that a TIF plan include an “economic feasibility study.” 191 Though
the statute does not specify what an “economic feasibility study” should
include,192 conceivably, a TIF project would not be economically feasible
if the development it seeks to attract would have located in the TIF district without any TIF subsidies. Furthermore, it seems to have become a
best practice of sorts among Idaho municipalities not to approve a TIF
plan unless it meets a “but for” standard.193
Idaho is not alone in its lack of a “but for” requirement. In 2008, only nineteen states applied a “but for” requirement.194 Like the statutory
blight requirement, courts have become less stringent in applying the
182. Briffault, supra note 6, at 79.
183. See Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 584, 94 Idaho 876,
885 (1972).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 77.
189. Id.
190. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2001–33, -2901–12 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
191. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(3) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
192. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2001–33, -2901–12 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
193. See Telephone Interview with Melinda Anderson, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Ryan P. Armbruster & Meghan S. Conrad, supra note 41.
194. See COUNCIL OF DEV. FIN. AGENCIES, ORIGINAL RESEARCH: 2008 TIF STATE-BYSTATE
REPORT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/0/8ee94afeece08bc988257936006747c5/$FILE/CDFA2008-TIF-State-By-State-Report.pdf.
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“but for” requirement.195 Although some TIF projects have been struck
down because they did not meet the “but for” threshold, courts are generally deferential to municipalities’ determinations of “but for” causation, even when such determinations are “debatable and even conclusory.”196 This may be because it can be very difficult to determine if development would have happened without TIF subsidies. 197 Still, deference
to local determinations of “but for” causation can be detrimental to
communities implementing TIF. A lack of “but for” causation could
mean that the URA or municipality is using TIF purely to garner its
increments, without concern for TIF’s ability to bring benefits to a community.198 Although “but for” standards are “usually very low hurdles
and not uniformly or rigorously applied,” 199 Idaho could help prevent
purely tax-driven TIF projects by making its “but for” standard explicit
and explaining exactly what an “economic feasibility study” should include.
Because Idaho does not have an explicit “but for” standard and rigorous application of the standard has fallen by the wayside, it is very
difficult to determine how the Idaho Supreme Court would decide a “but
for” challenge to a TIF project under Idaho’s current TIF statutes. On
one hand, the lack of an explicit “but for” standard in Idaho’s TIF statutes and lax application of the standard in general seem to imply that
the court likely would not strike down a TIF project with a weak showing of “but for” causation. On the other hand, if a “but for” challenge
presented facts extremely indicative of a lack of “but for” causation, the
court might strike down a TIF project for failing to create an economically feasible plan.
III. WHY TAX INCREMENT FINANCING SUCCEEDS AND WHY IT
IS CONTROVERSIAL
Although urban renewal has managed to thrive in the Idaho legal
system for the past fifty years,200 Idahoans continue to resent its existence as a part of our local government system.201 The success and controversy of TIF in Idaho and elsewhere is largely attributable to its ability to play off of aspects of local government.202 In a 2010 article, Colum195. Briffault, supra note 6, at 77–78.
196. Id.
197. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 39.
198. See Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 93–95.
199. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 39.
200. See e-mail and spreadsheet from Gary Houde, supra note 1 (showing that there
were seventy-three urban renewal districts in twenty-five of Idaho’s forty-four counties in
2013).
201. See generally O’Toole, supra note 2 (“[T]ax-increment financing allows cities to
steal funds that taxpayers think they have dedicated to schools, fire, and other programs in
order to subsidize favored developers, increase municipal budgets, and socially engineer the
way Idahoans live.”).
202. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 65.
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bia University Law Professor Richard Briffault writes, “TIF succeeds—
in the sense of its ubiquitous adoption and use—because it maps precisely onto the principal features of contemporary local government. So,
too, TIF is controversial because it exacerbates some of the basic tensions in our local government structure and policies.” 203 Professor
Briffault specifically identifies four inherent aspects of TIF that, while
making TIF successful, also aggravate tensions in local politics and economics:
TIF succeeds . . . because it, like local government more generally, is highly decentralized; reflects and reinforces the fiscalization of development policy; plays off the fragmentation of local
governments and the resulting interlocal struggle for investment; and fits well with the entrepreneurial spirit characteristic
of contemporary local economic development policy. A better understanding of TIF contributes to a better understanding of the
political economy of American local government.204
Such an understanding—of the interplay between TIF and local
government politics—is important to Idahoans’ understanding of TIF
and its evolving purposes. This section explains how the inherent aspects of TIF that Professor Briffault identifies cause TIF to succeed and
how they can also cause problems. This section also highlights changes
that the Idaho legislature has made and could make to Idaho’s TIF laws.
While these changes certainly cannot eliminate the problems TIF creates, they can mitigate them.
A. TIF is Decentralized like Local Government
More so than federal and state governments, municipalities have a
unique connection to their constituencies. Local governments need the
ability to make economic development decisions based on the unique
conditions, needs, and desires of their location and citizens. 205 Unlike
federal urban renewal, which restricted local control over economic development by conditioning receipt of federal funding on compliance with
federal regulations, 206 with TIF, local governments are given a large
amount of control over each aspect of a TIF project.207
As already noted, TIF’s proliferation has been astounding. 208 One
major reason TIF has experienced so much success is the decentralization of authority to implement TIF projects. 209 The federal government

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 85.
See id. at 69; Teaford, supra note 16, at 445.
Briffault, supra note 6, at 85–86.
See supra Part I.A.ii.
Briffault, supra note 6, at 84–86.
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does not have anything to do with TIF implementation. 210 State governments provide broad boundaries in which local governments make
most major decisions about how TIF will work within their municipalities. 211 Local governments are able to decide TIF district boundaries,
what kind of development to pursue, and what kind of infrastructure to
place in TIF districts.212 By vesting decision-making power in local governments, TIF allows local governments to shape the future of their
municipalities.213
The City of Nampa’s construction of the Idaho Center is one example of an Idaho community seeking to shape a distinct urban development vision. The Idaho Center was conceptualized by the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Nampa, which was formed in 1994, just
three years before the Idaho Center was constructed in 1997. 214 As Idaho’s second largest city, just twenty miles west of Boise, the agency envisioned Nampa competing with Boise for tourism and entertainment
dollars.215 The complex would be the home of the Snake River Stampede,
one of the largest rodeos in the nation, and the Idaho Stampede, Idaho’s
first semi-professional basketball team.216 It would also host large concerts, rallies, and meetings.217 The outdoor horse center would “accommodate[] a wide range of horse events.” 218 In addition to these largescale events, the complex would host college and high school sport competitions, high school and college graduations, community fundraisers,
trade shows, and various other community events.219 The Nampa URA
hoped bringing these events to the complex would “[e]nhance Nampa’s
community image / identity” by “putting Nampa on the map,” providing
a “[s]ense of community pride,” causing Nampa to be “viewed as a progressive community,” and sending the message that “Nampa is good
enough to support amenities.”220
The Idaho Center succeeded in achieving this vision. A benefits
analysis of the Idaho Center and the North Nampa Urban Renewal Area
published in 2004, the year the urban renewal area closed, states the
Idaho Center “[e]nhances quality of life [and] . . . the Treasure Valley’s
image as a major regional center” and “[r]einforces Nampa’s image and
importance within the region.”221 While these qualitative benefits were
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2901–12 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
212. Briffault, supra note 6, at 84.
213. Id. at 85.
214. Nampa, Idaho, Ordinance 2449, 4 (Nov. 14, 1994) (on file with author); BARNEY
& WORTH, INC. & CS PROJECTS, IDAHO CENTER COMMUNITY BENEFITS ANALYSIS 1 (2004)
[hereinafter BARNEY & WORTH] (on file with author).
215. BARNEY & WORTH, supra note 214, at 1, 22.
216. Id. at 1, 3, 7.
217. Id. at 7.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2, 10, 11.
220. Id. at 23.
221. Id. at 20.
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important factors in the decision to form the North Nampa Urban Renewal Area of which the Idaho Center was a part,222 Nampa’s urban renewal agency also hoped to spur development and increase the tax base
in the then barren north Nampa.223 The Idaho Center largely succeeded
in this aspect as well. The benefits analysis estimates that the Idaho
Center had succeeded in catalyzing approximately $31.3 million in direct and indirect contributions to the Nampa area economy between
2000 and 2004.224 The tax increment of the North Nampa Urban Renewal Area increased by 88% in 1996, 86% in 1997, and 59% in 1998.225
When the area closed in 2004, property taxes in the area were nearly
eight times what they were before the area was formed.226 Property taxes for agricultural land near the Idaho Center increased in value from
$2000 per acre in 1995 to $300,000 per acre when the area closed.227
Furthermore, after the construction of the Idaho Center, a plethora of
businesses settled in the area. Before the urban renewal area closed in
2004, prominent businesses such as the Idaho Center Auto Mall, an
enormous collection of car dealerships that sits on nearly forty-two acres
and employs over 408 people,228 and the College of Western Idaho, a
small community college with over 10,000 students and nearly 900 employees, had settled near the Idaho Center.229 Businesses have continued to build in the area after the urban renewal area closed. The Nampa
Gateway Center, a large commercial property whose major tenants include Sports Authority, Macy’s, Edwards Theatres, Discount Tire, and
JC Penney, opened near the Idaho Center in 2007. 230
i. Creating Oversight through Participatory Mechanisms
Although the decentralization of TIF has facilitated its proliferation and cities’ ability to respond to the needs of communities and shape
a development vision,231 it also means that there is little uniform oversight of cities’ use of TIF. 232 As previously mentioned, state governments
222. Nampa, Idaho, Ordinance 2449, 1 (Nov. 14, 1994).
223. BARNEY & WORTH, supra note 214, at 1.
224. Id. at 2.
225. Id. at 15.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Id.
228. About, IDAHO CTR. AUTO MALL, http://idahocenterautomall.com/about (last visited May 22, 2014).
229. Facts at a Glance, COLL. OF W. IDAHO, http://cwidaho.cc/info/facts-glance (last
visited May 22, 2014).
230. Holly Beech, Nampa Gateway Center Continues to Draw Tenants; Still Room for
Many More, IDAHO PRESS-TRIB., Nov. 20, 2010, http://www.idahopress.com/members/nampagateway-center-continues-to-draw-tenants-still-room-for/article_6fa7ee82-32d9-11e2-bc740019bb2963f4.html.
231. Supra Part III.A.–A.i.
232. See Craig L. Johnson, The Use of Debt in Tax Increment Financing, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 85; Kenneth M. Murchinson, Louisiana: From the Big Easy to the Suburbs, TIF and Its Dangers, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING 95, 107–08 (David Callies & Andrew Gowder, Jr. eds., 2012).
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provide broad boundaries in which local governments make most major
decisions about how TIF will work within their municipalities. 233 Thus,
cities are basically trusted to use TIF responsibly and efficiently without
any checks in place to prevent them from failing to do so.234 This has led
to concern for TIF projects with no accountability measures that fail “to
produce net benefits for all affected taxing entities.” 235
States have sought to mitigate this problem by adding citizen and
entity participatory mechanisms that take place during the plan adoption phase.236 The most prevalent citizen participatory mechanism is the
requirement that municipalities hold public hearings before creating a
TIF district or approving a TIF plan.237 In 2001, forty-two of the fortyeight states then authorized to use TIF required public hearings both
before a district was created and before a plan was adopted.238 In 2008,
forty-six of the forty-nine states that authorized TIF required hearings
to create a TIF district.239 Another citizen participatory mechanism, the
formation of citizens’ councils, is required in some states.240 This mechanism requires a citizens’ council to approve or modify a proposed TIF
plan before the TIF project can go forward.241
Some states require URAs to satisfy taxing entity participatory
measures before a district or plan can be approved, such as consultation
with the other taxing entities affected by a TIF plan.242 The most restrictive entity participatory measures allow other taxing entities to collectively veto a TIF plan.243 In 2008, thirty-two states had provided for
entity participatory measures in their TIF statutes.244 Because taxing
entities have a strong incentive to maximize the amount of taxes they
receive, these highly restrictive measures can severely inhibit a URA’s
ability to adopt a TIF plan unless the plan benefits all affected taxing
entities. 245 Thus, while citizen and entity participatory measures increase equity for residents and taxing entities, this equity comes at the
expense of efficiency.246 As the amount of control citizens and taxing entities have over plan adoption increases, the ability of a URA to efficiently do its job decreases.247
233.
234.

Supra Part III.A.; see also Murchinson, supra note 232, at 107–08.
See Craig L. Johnson, The Use of Debt in Tax Increment Financing, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 85; Murchinson,
supra note 232, at 107–08.
235. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 43.
236. Id. at 41–42.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. COUNCIL OF DEV. FIN. AGENCIES, supra note 194.
240. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 42.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. COUNCIL OF DEV. FIN. AGENCIES, supra note 194.
245. Id. at 43.
246. Id.
247. See id.
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ii. Participatory Mechanisms and Transparency in Idaho
Although Idaho’s TIF laws have and continue to provide a significant amount of citizen participation, the laws do not provide as much
citizen participation as some other states’ laws. Idaho’s urban renewal
laws were codified in 1966 with provisions for public hearings before the
adoption of an urban renewal plan.248 As part of the hearing, the URA
must “generally identify the urban renewal area covered by the plan.”249
This requirement effectively combines the hearing for district (area) and
plan creation. When the Idaho legislature adopted TIF in 1988, the legislature incorporated the requirement for public hearings before plan
and district approval into Idaho’s TIF laws and added a requirement
that a public hearing be held before a plan could be amended.250 The
legislature also included provisions requiring URAs to transmit the TIF
plan and a description of the TIF district to all affected taxing entities
before a TIF district is formed.251 There are no provisions for the formation of citizens’ councils in Idaho’s TIF laws.252 While Idaho would
likely benefit from citizens’ councils that consult with URAs about TIF
plans at the plan adoption phase, citizens’ councils that have too much
control over plan adoption will likely inhibit Idaho URAs’ ability to efficiently perform their functions.
A noteworthy Idaho citizen participatory mechanism is a 2011
amendment to subsection 50-2006(a) that gives citizens a significant
amount of control over the creation of urban renewal agencies. The
amendment requires “a majority of qualified electors, voting in a
citywide or countywide election . . . [to] vote to authorize [an urban renewal] agency to transact business and exercise its powers.” 253 This
amendment greatly increases the amount of voter participation in urban
renewal at the project initiation phase. Although the details of plan and
district formation are still left completely to the discretion of the URA,
URA formation now requires voter approval.254 While this new requirement makes it harder for Idaho municipalities to create urban renewal
agencies, most of the URAs in Idaho were created before the amend-

248. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 246, sec. 8, § 50-2008(c), 1965 Idaho
Sess. Laws 600, 607 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(c) (2009 & Supp.
2013)); see also Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 33–35 tbl. 3.1.
249. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(c) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
250. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 6, § 50-2906(1), 1988 Idaho Sess.
Laws 393, 397 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2906(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
251. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 7, § 50-2907(1), 1988 Idaho Sess.
Laws 393, 398 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2907(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
252. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2001–33, -2901–12 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
253. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 1, § 50-2006(a)(2), 2011 Idaho
Sess. Laws 910, 911 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(a)(2) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
254. Id.
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ment 255 and citizens are likely to approve a URA where there is a
need.256
Although Idaho only has one entity participatory measure, this
measure still provides for more entity participation than many other
states that have no such measures.257 The lone Idaho entity participatory measure is found in Idaho Code subsection 50-2906(1), which requires URAs to transmit a description of the TIF district and the TIF
plan to all affected taxing entities.258 Idaho’s TIF laws do not require
URAs to consult with or consider the input of the other taxing entities
involved in a TIF plan.259 With such minimal input, Idaho municipalities run the risk of adopting TIF plans that do not “proportionately
spread benefits and costs across all affected jurisdictions.”260 By amending its TIF statutes to encourage or require URAs to consult with taxing
entities before adoption of a TIF plan, the Idaho legislature would “give
affected taxing districts some influence over the process, without giving
them complete veto power, [thus] granting them a measure of input
without unduly constraining the authorizing body.”261 Such a “balanced
approach will probably yield the best results in terms of the mix of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity concerns.” 262
The Idaho legislature has also sought to provide oversight for TIF
projects by including transparency measures in Idaho’s TIF laws. 263 The
first of these measures was added in 2002 and requires URAs to comply
with Idaho’s public records and open meetings laws. 264 The second of
these measures was added in 2011 and requires each URA to hold a
public meeting where it reports its “activities for the preceding calendar
year, which report shall include a complete financial statement setting
forth its assets, liabilities, income and operating expense as of the end of
such calendar year,” and takes comments from the public. 265 These
transparency measures help the public ensure that Idaho URAs are acting efficiently and responsibly.
255. This amendment does not affect urban renewal agencies established before July
2011. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(a)(2) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
256. Telephone Interview with Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41.
257 For a tabular comparison of state-by-state participatory mechanisms, see Johnson
& Kriz, supra note 3, at 33–35 tbl. 3.1.
258. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2906(1), -2907(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
259. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 33–35 tbl. 3.1 (these are considered “additional participatory mechanisms”). See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2001–33, -2901–12
(2009 & Supp. 2013).
260. Id. at 43.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(c), (e) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
264. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 50-2006(e), 2002 Idaho
Sess. Laws 394, 396 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(e) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
265. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 1, § 50-2006(c), 2011 Idaho
Sess. Laws 910, 912 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(c) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
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B. TIF Promotes Fiscal Responsibility in Local Government
Because local government is largely decentralized, municipalities
must rely heavily on their own resources to finance operations.266 Local
governments basically have two ways to produce additional revenue for
financing their operations: they must either raise tax rates, a process
inhibited by local politics, or “increase the value of taxable resources.” 267
TIF is one of the only tools municipalities have to raise the value of resources subject to taxes.268 TIF does this by leveraging private investment to bring in new revenue.269 TIF encourages private development,
which in turn increases property values. 270 This increase in property
values provides additional revenue to municipalities. When TIF bonds
are paid off and all project costs are provided for, incremental revenues
produced by the TIF project are no longer allocated to project costs and
instead revert to the affected taxing entities, “thus generating either
new revenues or reducing tax rates for taxpayers.” 271 This is a major
selling point for TIF; it allows municipalities to finance their operations
without seeking additional funds from taxpayers. 272 This also goes to the
very heart of TIF. TIF is self-sustaining, which is attractive to municipalities that must answer to taxpayers while providing services and encouraging growth.273
i. Mitigating Unexpected Circumstances
Although TIF encourages fiscal responsibility and can generally
produce enough increment to successfully finance all project costs and
TIF bonds, unexpected economic factors, such as low occupancy rates,
may prevent TIF projects from catalyzing development, producing increments, and paying off bonds. 274 States can anticipate and prevent
such unexpected factors at the evaluation phase by enacting “legal provisions that require the evaluation of a project’s progress toward meeting the objectives laid out in the enabling ordinance . . . . If problems . . .
can be identified early in the redevelopment venture, then the authority
can act to alleviate the problems.” 275 In 2001, only nine states had eval-

266. Briffault, supra note 6, at 86.
267. Id.
268. See id.; J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing,
in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 16.
269. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 16.
270. Supra Part I.A.iii.
271. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 16.
272. Briffault, supra note 6, at 86–87.
273. See id.
274. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 52.
275. Id. at 52–53.
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uation provisions in their TIF statutes and Idaho was not one of
them.276
Idaho currently has no evaluation scheme provided for in its TIF
statutes.277 Idaho could prevent the risk of TIF projects failing due to
unexpected circumstances by enacting such a provision. 278 Massachusetts’s TIF statutes afford an excellent example. Massachusetts requires
a state Economic Assistance Coordinating Council to “conduct a continual evaluation of economic opportunity areas and the projects certified
for participation in the economic development incentive program.”279
While enacting an evaluation provision would likely help Idaho
municipalities identify and react to unexpected factors in an urban renewal project before the project is finished, it is possible that unsuccessful projects will still go forward. The transparency measures mentioned
previously280 can help Idaho municipalities learn from the mistakes of
urban renewal projects that are already completed and mitigate those
mistakes going forward.
ii. Screening Unrealistic Expectations
Another fiscal responsibility problem arises when municipalities
expect TIF projects to produce revenue for the municipality independent
of tax increment.281 Although the private development generated by a
TIF project usually produces additional revenues for cities, those revenues can be offset by TIF projects that are expected to independently
produce revenues for the city, but fail to do so.282 Thus, even though tax
increment has provided for all of a project’s costs and bonds, cities are
forced to subsidize TIF projects that do not produce independent revenue.283
The Idaho Center is a relevant example of this. Although the Idaho
Center illustrates a city using TIF to shape a unique development vision,284 that vision may not have been the best way to stimulate private
development. As previously noted, the Idaho Center achieved many of
its development goals. After the Idaho Center was completed, many
businesses settled nearby and property taxes surrounding the Idaho
Center increased eight fold.285 However, the Idaho Center itself has nev276. See id. at 45–47 tbl. 3.2, 53.
277. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2001–33, -2901–12 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
278. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 53.
279. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 23A, § 3C (West, Westlaw through chapter 70 of the
2014 2nd Annual Sess.).
280. Supra Part II.A.ii.
281. Idaho Press-Trib. Editorial Bd., Idaho Center Worth Keeping, IDAHO PRESSTRIB.,
July
14,
2013,
http://www.idahopress.com/members/idaho-center-worthkeeping/article_a34b6b86-eb45-11e2-a9fe-001a4bcf887a.html; infra Part III.B.ii
282. Infra Part III.B.ii.; see also Idaho Press-Trib. Editorial Bd., supra note 281.
283. Infra Part III.B.ii.; see also Idaho Press-Trib. Editorial Bd., supra note 281.
284. Supra Part III.A.–A.i.
285. Supra Part III.A.–A.i.
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er become a self-sustaining investment. Practically every year since
opening, the Idaho Center has produced net losses. Those losses totaled
$394,425 in 2000; $537,408 in 2001; $507,116 in 2002; $774,755 in
2003; 286 $1,084,743 in 2007; $1,363,426 in 2008; $1,208,499 in 2009;
$696,486 in 2010; $1,764,897 in 2011; $1,569,294 in 2012; and
$1,803,634 in 2013.287
The Idaho Center benefits analysis, which was published in 2004,
noted, “[T]he Nampa events complex persistently continues to lose money, requiring an annual operating subsidy from the Urban Renewal
Agency.”288 The analysis attributes the Idaho Center’s poor performance
to market conditions:
Market conditions facing the events business have not been favorable in recent years. Across the nation, more than seventy
concert venues have been built in the past five years, while the
number of proven acts on tour—musical performers, circuses,
family shows—have dropped significantly. Concert promoters
today are focusing on the largest markets, where 20,000 seat
“mega-arenas” can sell out at the highest ticket prices. In the
Pacific Northwest, with economic conditions lagging behind the
nation’s rebound from recession, many event venues are reporting a significant drop in their business. The Idaho Center, along
with many of its peers, has not been able to run its operation on
a break-even basis.289
This benefits analysis was published before the start of the recession in 2007.290 After the recession was well underway, in 2010, the Idaho Press-Tribune reported that the Idaho Center continued to struggle,
noting that “‘B market’ entertainment venues” were floundering because

286. BARNEY & WORTH, supra note 214, at 13.
287. DEP’T OF FIN., CITY OF NAMPA, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCE REPORT 76
(2007), available at http://www.cityofnampa.us/DocumentCenter/View/31; DEP’T OF FIN.,
CITY OF NAMPA, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCE REPORT 73 (2008), available at
http://www.cityofnampa.us/DocumentCenter/View/32; DEP’T OF FIN., CITY OF NAMPA,
COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL
FINANCE
REPORT
76
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cityofnampa.us/DocumentCenter/View/33; DEP’T OF FIN., CITY OF NAMPA,
COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL
FINANCE
REPORT
74
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cityofnampa.us/DocumentCenter/View/34; DEP’T OF FIN., CITY OF NAMPA,
COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL
FINANCE
REPORT
75
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cityofnampa.us/DocumentCenter/View/35; DEP’T OF FIN., CITY OF NAMPA,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCE REPORT 74 (2012), available at http://idnampa.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/850; DEP’T OF FIN., CITY OF NAMPA,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCE REPORT 78 (2013), available at http://idnampa.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/1786. Information for 1995–2000, 2004–2006
was unavailable.
288. BARNEY & WORTH, supra note 214, at 3.
289. Id. at 4.
290. See id.; Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., Determination of the December 2007 Peak in
Economic
Activity,
THE
NAT’L
BUREAU
OF
ECON.
RESEARCH,
http://www.nber.org/dec2008.html (last visited May 22, 2014).
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“[e]ntertainment dollars are some of the first to dry up in a recession.” 291
Considering the Idaho Center’s failure to produce revenues since its inception, whether the events center will ever produce revenues seems
questionable. The Idaho Center’s poor performance thus raises the question: considering Nampa’s location and size, was an events center a wise
use of Nampa TIF funds?
a. Keeping the Public Informed through Plan Requirements
Where a TIF project fails to meet revenue-production expectations
for cities, it is important to focus on the positive benefits the project accomplishes. While the Nampa URA likely hoped the Idaho Center would
bring in revenue, it was probably more focused on the morale it would
inspire in the community, the economic development it would catalyze,
and the effect it would have on property taxes. 292 Its goals in these areas
were largely met.293 However, critics will still condemn projects that do
not produce revenues as expected.294 States can mitigate this criticism
at the plan formulation phase by requiring urban renewal plans to (1)
conform to existing community plans, (2) include precise descriptions of
the planned uses for the TIF district, and (3) provide estimates of project
costs.295 Such elements will inform the public about the feasibility of the
plan and help them decide whether the plan will complement the community.
A TIF plan should state “the objectives of the redevelopment project and should reflect the interests and existing plans of the community
as a whole.” 296 These interests can be gleaned from existing master
community plans.297 Master community plans typically expound matters
necessary to community development such as “aspects relating to zoning, densities of residential and commercial properties, [and] the provision of affordable housing.” 298 URAs should use master community
plans to ensure that their TIF projects will complement the community,
rather than offend it.299 In 2001, at least thirty-two states required TIF
plans to conform to master community plans. 300 Moreover, plans that
include the project costs of and specify the planned uses in a TIF area
will further ensure that TIF projects complement the community.301 Re291. Mike Butts, Idaho Center Subsidy Increases, IDAHO PRESS-TRIB., Dec. 5, 2010,
http://www.idahopress.com/news/idaho-center-subsidy-increases/article_667c32c6-0010-11e08c1e-001cc4c03286.html.
292. Supra Part III.A.i.
293. Supra Part III.A.i.
294. See Idaho Press-Trib. Editorial Bd., supra note 281.
295. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 40.
296. Id. at 39–40.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 40.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 33–35 tbl. 3.1.
301. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 39–40.
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quiring inclusion of these elements in an urban renewal plan will encourage urban renewal agencies to plan according to public need.302 If
the plan is not acceptable, the inclusion of these elements, with the help
of the citizen participatory measures described earlier, will help spark
“the public debate on the appropriateness of the public expenditure” and
screen those plans that fail to garner public support. 303 If a community
supports an urban renewal plan from the outset, it will be more likely to
condone its failings.
b. Plan Requirements in Idaho
Compared to other states, Idaho’s TIF laws have fairly restrictive
plan requirements. 304 Idaho’s TIF laws have required urban renewal
plans to conform to existing community plans, include precise descriptions of the planned uses for the TIF district, and provide estimates of
project costs since the Local Economic Development Act was passed in
1988.305 Several subsections of Idaho Code make up Idaho’s requirement
that urban renewal plans conform to master community plans.306 Idaho
Code subsections 50-2905(2) and (4) contain Idaho’s requirement that
urban renewal plans include project costs and specify the planned uses
for a project area.307
In addition to the plan requirements listed above, the Local Economic Development Act has always required that urban renewal plans
contain an economic feasibility study (Idaho’s only resemblance of a “but
for” requirement), fiscal impact statement, and description of how the
URA will finance project costs.308 The Idaho legislature added two more
requirements in 2002. These additions were the result of the legislature
setting a time limit on urban renewal projects in 2000.309 The additions
require that urban renewal plans include the project’s termination date
and a “description of the disposition or retention of any assets of the

302. See id.
303. Id.; see also supra Part III.A.i.–ii.
304. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 33–35 tbl. 3.1; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905
(2009 & Supp. 2013).
305. See Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 5, § 50-2905(1), (3), 1988
Idaho Sess. Laws 393, 397 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(2), (4) (2009
& Supp. 2013)); Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 246, sec. 8, § 50-2008(b), 1965 Idaho
Sess. Laws 600, 607 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(b) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
306. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2008(b), (d), (g), -2009, -2018(12)(g) (2009 & Supp.
2013).
307. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(2), (4) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
308. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 5, § 50-2905(2), (4)–(5) 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 393, 397 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(3), (5)–(6) (2009
& Supp. 2013)).
309. See Local Economic Development Act, ch. 275, sec. 2, § 50-2904, 2000 Idaho
Sess. Laws 893, 897 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
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agency upon the termination date.” 310 In 2011, the Idaho legislature
added yet another requirement: that urban renewal plans include the
assessed value of the project area at the beginning of the project year
and the assessed value of all taxable property in the municipality. 311
This requirement allows municipalities to confirm that an urban renewal area is blighted at the outset of a project and that development within
an area is stimulating the tax base in comparison to the rest of the city
as a project goes forward.
While these requirements, taken together, certainly help inform
communities about the desirability of an urban renewal plan, some of
the requirements are undefined, which makes it difficult to know if the
requirement has been met. For example, Idaho Code does not define
what the standard for conformance with master community plans is.312
This essentially leaves the interpretation of whether a TIF plan conforms with a master community plan to each individual URA. Furthermore, subsection 50-2905(2) only requires “[a] statement listing the
kind, number, and location of all proposed public works or improvements within the revenue allocation area.” 313 URAs are allowed to make
their descriptions as general or specific as they desire. Finally, as previously mentioned, the statute does not describe what an economic feasibility study is, thus making the only resemblance of a “but for” standard
in Idaho’s TIF laws a fairly easy hurdle to cross. Setting a standard for
these requirements will take the interpretation of whether TIF plans
meet the requirements out of the hands of URAs, thus increasing the
public’s ability to screen impractical or incompatible projects.
C. TIF Plays Off of Local Government Competition
TIF’s ability to generate financing for local government projects can
create or intensify competition between local government jurisdictions.314 This competition comes in two forms: between adjoining communities vying for regional development and between URAs and taxing
entities vying for tax increments.315
i. Between Adjoining Communities
Because TIF helps local governments attract businesses, thus increasing the tax base and providing for local services, bordering com310. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 143, sec. 4, § 50-2905(6)–(7), 2002 Idaho
Sess. Laws 394, 401 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(7)–(8) (2009 &
Supp. 2013)).
311. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 8, § 50-2905(1), 2011 Idaho Sess.
Laws 910, 923 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
312. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2008(b), (d), (g), -2009, -2018(12)(g) (2009 & Supp.
2013).
313. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(2) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
314. Briffault, supra note 6, at 88.
315. Id.
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munities often use TIF as a bargaining chip.316 Indeed, “TIF adoption is
frequently a copycat phenomenon, with a municipality more likely to
implement a TIF program when other municipalities in the vicinity
have done so.”317 The existence of TIF plans in a municipality can be the
difference between a thriving development community and a stagnant
one. 318 Thus, where one local government implements TIF projects,
neighboring governments are sure to follow in order to maintain an even
playing field.319 This competition has partly driven the success and proliferation of TIF.320 Even if a local government has no desire to use TIF,
if its neighboring communities are using TIF, it may be inclined to do
so.321 While this is an important aspect of why TIF is successful, it is
rarely a source of controversy. It is hard for a neighboring community to
complain about losing private investment to its counterparts using TIF
when it generally has an equal ability to use TIF.322
ii. Between Taxing Entities
TIF also promotes competition between overlapping taxing entities,
such as fire districts, counties, and school districts, which resent the allocation of tax increments to URAs in a TIF district.323 While the competition that TIF promotes between nearby communities is not controversial, competition between taxing entities is one of the most controversial
aspects of TIF and promotes distrust and infighting, which ultimately
hinders the realization of entities’ and URAs’ goals.324 As previously explained, TIF works by setting a base value that continues to go to the
various taxing entities.325 As property tax values in the TIF district increase, any property tax revenues that exceed the set base value go to
the URA to fund improvements. 326 These increments are often quite
large.327 Although the increments are eventually returned to the entities
when the project closes, entities often feel entitled to these funds while
projects remain open.328 The taxing entities that most often feel slighted
by the formation of a TIF area are school districts.329 An Illinois study
found that TIF formation “appears to have created an atmosphere of
mistrust between school districts and municipalities.” 330
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See id. at 90.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 90.
See id. at 88.
See id. at 89.
Supra Part I.A.iii.
Supra Part I.A.iii.
See Briffault, supra note 6, at 88.
See id. at 88–89.
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A timely Idaho example of such mistrust is a recent lawsuit between Nez Perce County and the City of Lewiston’s URA. The dispute
arose after Lewiston’s URA had finished all the work in a TIF plan and
all plan costs were provided for. 331 Idaho Code subsection 50-2909(4)
requires that when a TIF
area plan budget . . . estimates that all financial obligations
have been provided for . . . and the agency has determined no
additional project costs need be funded through revenue allocation financing [TIF], the allocation of revenues . . . shall thereupon cease; any moneys . . . in excess of the amount necessary to
pay such principal and interest shall be distributed to the affected taxing districts . . . .332
The URA’s budget for the coming year showed that increment had
provided for all the costs of the plan.333 The county filed a writ of mandamus to compel the URA to close the two areas in the plan and return
any excess funds to the taxing entities.334 A writ of mandamus compels a
government entity to perform acts it has a clear legal duty to perform.335
The county argued that, although the plan was still within the twenty
years allotted for it by Idaho Code section 50-2904, because all the work
in the plan was completed and the budget provided for all future plan
costs, Idaho Code subsection 2909(4) imposed a ministerial duty on the
URA to either close the areas in the plan and distribute any money in
excess of the amount needed to pay for remaining plan costs or amend
the plan to include more projects. 336 Any incremental revenues that
were still accruing for the plan would revert back to the county and other taxing entities.337
Rather than closing the areas, the URA wanted to rebate some of
the excess funds and keep the areas open until it could determine if increment was needed to fund projects the URA wanted to add to the
plan.338 Idaho Code subsection 50-2903(5) states in part:
An agency shall, by September 1 of each calendar year, adopt
and publish . . . a budget for the next fiscal year. . . . For the fiscal year that immediately predates the termination date for an
urban renewal plan . . . the agency shall adopt and publish a
budget specifically for the projected revenues and expenses of
331. Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Verified Petition for Writs of Mandate and Writs
of Prohibition at 3, Nez Perce Cnty. v. City of Lewiston, No. CV2013-01608 (Idaho Dist. Ct.
Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
332. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2909(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
333. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331, at 3.
334. Id. at 7.
335. Verified Answer at 11, Nez Perce Cnty. v. City of Lewiston, No. CV2013-01608
(Idaho Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2013).
336. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331, at 6–7.
337. See id. at 8–9; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2909(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
338. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331, at 4; Verified Answer, supra note 335, at 14.
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the plan and make a determination as to whether the revenue
allocation area can be terminated before the [sic] January 1 of
the termination year . . . .339
The URA asserted that, according to subsection 50-2903(5), termination of an urban renewal area before the twenty-year time limit is
discretionary, not ministerial, and thus the county’s writ must fail.340
According to the URA, if a URA determines that an area should be terminated it should publish a specific termination budget for the coming
year.341 Because the agency had discretion to terminate the area and to
create a specific termination budget, and it did not do either, the URA
asserted that it could keep the areas open and continue to collect tax
increments until it made such findings or the twenty years allotted for
the urban renewal plan expired.342 Furthermore, the URA asserted that
because several subsections in title 50, chapters 20 and 29 provide that
an urban renewal plan may be amended anytime in the twenty years
allotted for a plan, the URA had discretion to add new projects to the
plan anytime before the conclusion of the twenty-year time limit.343
The district court held that the URA was allowed to keep the areas
open.344 The county filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration
in December 2013; however, that motion was denied in February 2014
and the county has not sought any further action.345
a. Reducing Tension between Taxing Entities and URAs through
Financial Management Restrictions
Nez Perce County’s actions display the tension that TIF can create
between local governing entities. 346 This tension hinders the realization
of both URAs’ and taxing entities’ goals. 347 Although this tension will
exist practically anytime TIF is used, some states have enacted financial
management restrictions at the plan implementation phase to limit the
burden that TIF may impose and provide relief to entities that have a
greater need for the increments that TIF would normally capture. 348 The
first of these restrictions requires URAs to return excess TIF revenues

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(5) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
See Verified Answer, supra note 335, at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9–11.
See Joel Mills, Judge Rules 2 Lewiston URA Districts Can Stay Open,
LMTRIBUNE.COM, Feb. 1, 2014, http://lmtribune.com/northwest/article_55376017-a562-556b9afb-ad08031d3b5a.html.
345. See Sophie Miraglio, Nez Perce County Files Petition to Clarify and Reconsider
URA
Ruling,
KLEWTV.COM
(Dec.
27,
2013,
10:20
AM),
http://www.klewtv.com/news/local/COUNTY-VS-CITY-237502641.html.
346. See generally Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331.
347. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 89.
348. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 48.
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when a TIF plan is terminated.349 As shown by the Nez Perce County
case, TIF projects often accrue more increments than are needed to finance project costs.350 These excess funds should ideally be returned to
the other taxing entities involved in a TIF project once the project is
terminated.351 In 2001, at least sixteen states had restrictions requiring
the URAs to return excess TIF funds.352 The Nez Perce County case also
displays that, whether these funds should be returned as soon as a TIF
project is finished and financed is not always clear. 353 However, one
thing is certain, “[a] ‘perpetual’ TIF district was likely not envisioned by
those seeking to promote current redevelopment in an area.” 354 This is
why many states have set time limits for TIF projects or areas in the
first place, because “[i]f TIDs are not limited in the period of time they
may collect diverted taxes, authority members may inappropriately use
such revenues for purposes not explicitly approved in the capital planning process.”355
Another financial management restriction compels URAs to reimburse the losses entities may incur in the initial stages of TIF implementation. 356 TIF projects can sometimes cause the assessed value of
land to fall initially.357 As a result, taxing entities lose the money they
otherwise would have received had no TIF project been implemented.358
As Johnson and Kriz note:
If these “losses” . . . go unreimbursed by the authority in charge
of redevelopment, then the proposed TIF project is not strictly
financed through increments. . . . [T]his gets at the very nature
of TIF. Financing redevelopment in a self-supporting way has
always been the primary selling point for municipalities seeking
a technique to redevelop previously blighted areas. 359
Despite the importance of this requirement, only seven states had
such a requirement in 2001.360 North Dakota’s law provides an excellent
example. The law provides that after the county auditor certifies any tax
losses, then,
[u]pon receipt of any tax increments in the fund, the county
treasurer, at the times when the county treasurer distributes
collected taxes to the state and to each political subdivision for
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id.; Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331, at 6–7.
Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 48.
Id.
Id. at 45–47 tbl. 3.2.
See generally Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331.
Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 53.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 49.
See id.
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which a tax loss has previously been recorded, shall also remit to
each of them from the tax increment fund an amount proportionate to the amount of that tax loss, until all those tax losses
have been reimbursed.361
The final restriction partially or completely exempts school districts
from surrendering tax increments. 362 Because school districts have historically received a bigger portion of property tax revenues, there is often concern that TIF projects place a greater burden on school districts
than other taxing entities. 363 As a result, some states have exempted
school districts from TIF projects to some degree or another.364
b. Financial Management Restrictions in Idaho
As displayed by the Nez Perce County case, Idaho Code subsection
50-2909(4) requires URAs to return excess TIF funds at the termination
of a TIF plan.365 This subsection has been in Idaho’s TIF laws (with minor changes in 2002366) since they were codified in 1988.367 Idaho’s TIF
laws in this area are rather restrictive when compared to other states. 368
However, this section could benefit from clarification about whether
termination before the twenty years allotted for a TIF plan is solely at
the URA’s discretion or if it can be triggered by completion and financing of a plan.369
Idaho’s TIF laws also require URAs to return excess funds for TIF
plans that go beyond the twenty-year time limit set by section 502904. 370 Section 50-2904 creates several exceptions that allow a TIF
plan to exceed twenty years. 371 Subsection 50-2904(5) requires a TIF
plan that exceeds twenty years under one of these exemptions to return
revenues exceeding the amount necessary to repay bonds to the various
taxing entities on a pro rata basis.372 This subsection was enacted in

361. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 40-58-20(7) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
362. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 49.
363. See id.
364. Id.
365. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331, at 4–5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2909(4)
(2009 & Supp. 2013).
366. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 143, sec. 5, § 50-2909(4), 2002 Idaho Sess.
Laws 394, 401–02 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2909(4) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
367. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 9, § 50-2909(4), 1988 Idaho Sess.
Laws 393, 400 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2909(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
368. Compare Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 33–35, 45–47 (comparing how states
deal with excess TIF funds) with infra Part V (tracking the history of how Idaho has dealt
with excess TIF funds).
369. See generally Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 331.
370. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904(5) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
371. Id. at § 50-2904(1)–(4).
372. Id. at § 50-2904(5)
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2000,373 the same year the legislature created a time limit for TIF plans,
which was initially twenty-four years374 but changed to twenty years in
2011.375
Idaho is one of the pioneers of school district exemptions. 376 In
2001, just fourteen states had school district exemptions.377 Idaho had a
partial school district exemption from the time the Local Economic Development Act was codified in 1988378 until the exemption was removed
in 2006.379 In 2008, the Idaho legislature created another partial school
district exemption, which exempted voted-on levies from going to
URAs.380 School districts have variety of levies, some of which are voted
and others that do not require a vote. 381 The 2008 exemption prevents
any levies that are voted on from being collected by URAs.382 Because
the non-voted levies are generally small, Idaho’s school district exemption prevents school districts from surrendering a substantial amount of
increment.383 The creation of this exemption was a step in the right direction for Idaho, a state with notoriously low education spending.384
Idaho does not have any financial management restrictions that
require URAs to reimburse entities for losses they incur in the initial
stages of TIF implementation.385 As already noted, reimbursing entities
for these losses is integral to assuring that TIF is a self-sustaining
mechanism of financing redevelopment. 386 By adding such a requirement, the Idaho legislature would ensure that the self-supporting nature of TIF remains a selling point for municipalities using TIF in their
jurisdictions.

373. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 275, sec. 2, § 50-2904(3), 2000 Idaho Sess.
Laws 893, 896–97 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904(5) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
374. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 275, sec. 2, § 50-2904, 2000 Idaho Sess.
Laws 893, 896–97 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
375. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 7, § 50-2904, 2011 Idaho Sess.
Laws 910, 922–23 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
376. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 49–50.
377. Id. at 49.
378. See id. at 49–50; Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 8, § 502908(2)(a)(iii), 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 393, 398–99.
379. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 1, sec. 14, § 50-2908(2)(a)(iii), 2006 Idaho
Sess.
Laws
1st
Extraordinary
Sess.,
available
at
http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2006spcl/H0001.html.
380. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 253, sec. 1, § 50-2908(1)(e), 2008 Idaho
Sess. Laws 740, 741 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2908(1)(f) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
381. Telephone Interview with Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41.
382. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 253, sec. 1, § 50-2908(1)(e), 2008 Idaho
Sess. Laws 740, 741 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2908(1)(f) (2009 & Supp.
2013)).
383. Telephone Interview with Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41.
384. Kevin Richert, Idaho Ranks No. 50 in Per-Pupil Spending, IDAHO EDUC. NEWS
(May 21, 2013), http://www.idahoednews.org/news/idaho-ranks-no-50-in-per-pupil-spending/.
385. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2001–33, -2901–12 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
386. Supra Part III.C.ii.a.
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D. TIF Encourages Public-Private Collaboration like Contemporary
Economic Development Efforts
The last way TIF is similar to local government is in its ability to
facilitate public-private collaboration. 387 Without private investment,
TIF would not be a viable way to stimulate economic development. TIF
depends on private investment to boost the property tax base, thus
providing increments to pay for projects. 388 To woo private investors,
municipalities often use TIF to construct infrastructure (such as roads,
sewer lines, parking lots, and lighting) that private investors would
have otherwise had to pay for themselves.389 Such interaction between
public and private actors necessarily requires a great deal of collaboration and coordination to accomplish the proposed objectives. 390
An excellent example of public and private actors collaborating
through TIF for the well-being of an Idaho community is the world’s
largest yogurt plant that was constructed in Twin Falls by Chobani in
2012.391 Evidence of this collaboration is in the development agreement
between the City of Twin Falls, the Twin Falls URA, and Chobani (referred to as Agro-Farma).392 Several times throughout the agreement,
the completion of the project is conditioned on the cooperation of the
parties involved.393 The distinct and essential roles each public and private actor played in the agreement emphasize the necessity of each actor’s cooperation in the successful completion of the project.394
The agreement required the city to “[c]omplete a public pretreatment wastewater treatment system . . . to accommodate . . . compliance with the Industrial Wastewater Discharge Permit” required for
the plant;395 “cooperate with and assist URA and\or Agro-Farma in applying for and obtaining all permits and approvals;” and “expedite and
fast track all such permits, inspections, and approvals.” 396 The URA was
required to cooperate with Agro-Farma “to determine the total investment to be made by Agro-Farma for the A-F Plant, the tax increment
funds to be generated by the A-F Plant, and the maximum amount of
the URA Financing.” 397 This amount was to be a minimum of
387. Briffault, supra note 6, at 91.
388. Supra Part I.A.iii.
389. Briffault, supra note 6, at 92.
390. Id. at 91–92.
391. Press Release, Chobani Foodservice, Chobani Celebrates Grand Opening of
World’s Largest Yogurt Manufacturing Plant in Twin Falls, Idaho (Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release], http://chobanifoodservice.com/who-we-are/news-and-events/chobanicelebrates-grand-opening-of-worlds-largest-yogurt-manufacturing-plant-in-twin-falls-idaho/;
see also Development Agreement, City of Twin Falls, Urban Renewal Agency of the City of
Twin Falls, Agro-Farma, Inc. (Nov. 3, 2011) (on file with author).
392. See generally Development Agreement, supra note 391.
393. See generally id.
394. Id. at 5–8, 12.
395. Id. at 3.
396. Id. at 6.
397. Id. at 8.
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$17,340,000, which would be used for “property acquisition, site development, pretreatment facilities, sewer trunk line improvements, water
line improvements, power and gas line extensions, . . . [and] other expenses related to the project.”398 In exchange, Agro-Farma agreed to invest at least $128,000,000 and as much as $300,000,000 to build the
plant.399 Because Agro-Farma decided to expand the plant, the URA’s
financing ended up being $36,260,927 400 and Agro-Farma ended up expending closer to $450 million on the project.401
The benefits of public-private collaboration can be seen in the construction of the Chobani plant and its resulting effect on the community.
Chobani constructed plant in 326 days, and employed 2,000 people to do
so.402 Chobani estimated it would employ 400 employees at the plant 403
and “for every 10 jobs it create[d] directly, it . . . expected to create
roughly 66 additional jobs in ancillary businesses.”404 Twin Falls City
Manager Travis Rothweiler expected that the plant would employ up to
500 employees once it was running at full capacity. 405 Chobani also supports the local community by purchasing its dairy supply locally.406 All
in all, the state expected the economic impact of the plant’s business to
be $1.3 billion.407 Mr. Rothweiler also stated, “The opportunities Chobani has presented are incredible. . . . We’ve seen an 80[%] increase in single-family home permits in the last year. I can’t say Chobani is all of it,
but what they have brought, in terms of that sense of optimism about
our community, is huge.”408 Obviously, not all TIF projects will produce
the same effects as the Chobani plant; however, the success of the Chobani plant displays the public benefit a TIF project can provide to the
community when public and private actors effectively work together.
Even though the public-private nature of TIF can generate TIF’s
greatest benefits, it is also seen as one of TIF’s greatest flaws.409 Indeed,
“TIF is simultaneously popular and controversial because of its central
role in enabling local governments to work closely with private busi-

398. Id.
399. Id. at 1.
400. Emilie Ritter Saunders, Chobani Opens Twin Falls Yogurt Facility Today, but
at What Cost to Taxpayers?, STATEIMPACT (Dec. 17, 2012, 7:00 AM),
https://stateimpact.npr.org/idaho/2012/12/17/chobani-opens-twin-falls-yogurt-facility-todaybut-at-what-cost-to-taxpayers/.
401. Press Release, supra note 391.
402. Id.
403. Development Agreement, supra note 391, at 13.
404. Stephanie Strom, U.S. Hunger for Yogurt Leads to Gigantic Factory, N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
17,
2012,
at
B3,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/business/chobani-to-open-huge-yogurt-factory-inidaho.html?_r=0.
405. Saunders, supra note 400.
406. Press Release, supra note 391.
407. Strom, supra note 404.
408. Saunders, supra note 400.
409. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 92–93.
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nesses in promoting development.”410 TIF is generally considered a public purpose because it is usually tied to urban renewal and alleviating
blight.411 However, with the relaxation of blight requirements, TIF critics assert that it is no longer being used for a public purpose because it
is no longer alleviating blight. 412 This is true in predominantly rural
states, such as Idaho, where traditional definitions of urban blight are
hard to find.413 What critics refuse to recognize, however, is whether TIF
is used for development or redevelopment, it provides public benefits
and is thus a public purpose. Even when TIF is used for development, it
brings significant benefits to a community. The Chobani plant exemplified this. Jobs, tax revenues, community optimism, and overall economic
growth are tangible public benefits that are not small potatoes, even for
Idahoans.414
Legislatures in at least seventeen states have recognized these
benefits by eliminating blight as a precondition for the creation of a TIF
district.415 This approach is not only more intellectually honest, 416 but
some scholars believe that it is also a better use of TIF.417 USC Law Professor George Lefcoe asserts, “TIFs depend upon dramatic increases in
property value and, as a result, are geared more toward new commercial
investment, often in well-heeled suburban neighborhoods.” 418 Consequently,
[p]rograms of wholesale blight eradication funded by TIF do not
work well in stagnant, poorer communities. An optimal TIF project is one that can be built quickly, at the highest conceivable
density and at the greatest fair market value, garnering huge
retail sales. In places lacking dramatic growth in effective demand for space, property values and tax revenues are not going
to increase quickly and broadly enough to finance the costs of
acquisition and redevelopment.419
While eliminating blight as a precondition for the creation of a TIF
district may not be necessary in Idaho, Professor Lefcoe’s assertions
suggest that Idaho should not unduly limit TIF through strict blight
requirements.

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id. at 93.

Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 70–71.
See Briffault, supra note 6, at 87–88.
Telephone Interview with Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41.
See H. Lawrence Hoyt, What’s the “TIF” All About, in TAX INCREMENT
FINANCING, supra note 232, at 25.
415. COUNCIL OF DEV. FIN. AGENCIES, supra note 194.
416. H. Lawrence Hoyt, What’s the “TIF” All About, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING,
supra note 232, at 21–22.
417. See Lefcoe, supra note 27 at 67–74.
418. Id. at 72.
419. Id. at 69.
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i. Providing Public Benefits through Agreements with Developers
Although TIF projects used for development can rightfully be considered a public purpose, on the other end of the spectrum, purely development- or tax-driven TIF projects can cause local officials to treat TIF
like a “cash cow” without concern for a project’s ability to bring benefits
to a community.420 “But for” causation is one way to alleviate such situations. However, as discussed in part II.B.2., “but for” standards are usually easy to meet and are not strictly applied. Another way to prevent
such situations is by requiring private developers to enter into community benefit agreements at the plan formulation phase.421 These agreements often include
specified numbers of new affordable housing units, a commitment to hire local labor first, a developer's commitment to create
a specified number of jobs at living wages, and job training. “Because the agreements are negotiated between community coalitions and interested developers, the benefits can be tailored to
meet specific community needs, such as the need for parks, daycare centers, or job-training facilities.” Community representatives come from the neighborhood and from labor, environmental, and religious organizations, often assisted by public interest
lawyers and city staff, and encouraged by elected city officials. 422
Although these agreements are similar to the development agreements that cities often make with private developers (such as the one
Chobani entered into with the City of Twin Falls and the Twin Falls
URA), because they are negotiated by community groups, rather than
city and URA officials, they are more focused on pursuing as much public benefit as possible from a given TIF project.423 Community benefit
agreements “are considered by their supporters to be powerful tools for
assuring that communities’ needs will not be neglected by large developers.”424
ii. Agreements with Developers in Idaho
Although Idaho Code allows for development agreements between
cities, URAs, and private developers, these agreements can only be entered into if the private developer is also seeking a rezone. 425 With
many Idaho TIF projects, private developers are seeking a rezone, and
URAs are thus allowed to enter into development agreements with the
420. See id. at 94.
421. Id. at 95–96.
422. Id. (quoting Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits
Agreements,
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 19,
19
(2008), available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1157613).
423. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 422, at 19.
424. Id. at 20.
425. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6511A (2009 & Supp. 2013).
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developers.426 However, it is possible that a developer would not seek a
rezone as part of a TIF project, and, accordingly, the municipality involved in the TIF project would not be able to enter into a development
agreement with the developer. Furthermore, when municipalities are
allowed to enter into development agreements, the agreements are negotiated by cities and URAs and thus may not be as publicly focused as
community benefit agreements, which are negotiated by community
groups.427
Idaho Code could profit from a provision that encourages or requires URAs to enter into community benefit agreements with private
developers that lay out specific public benefits that a private development will provide. These agreements would not be conditioned on a rezone and, ideally, community groups with the help of public interest
lawyers and city staff, rather than URAs or cities, would negotiate the
agreements. Encouraging or requiring URAs to make such agreements
with private developers would help ensure that TIF in Idaho does not
become a purely tax-driven mechanism.428
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed earlier, California, the birthplace of TIF, eliminated
its urban renewal program in 2012.429 Although urban renewal finances
had yet to be completely wound down in January 2014, the same California legislators who sought to eliminate the program were already
writing proposals to revive it, albeit with a different title.430 The most
ambitious attempt at re-establishment was Senate Bill 1, which would
encourage “development in transit priority areas, small walkable communities and clean energy manufacturing sites.” 431 Governor Jerry
Brown, who spurred the elimination of the program and indicated that
it was too early to reinstate the program in 2013, has even proposed
creating more modest “infrastructure financing districts” that require
approval by 55% of local voters.432 Other proponents have sought to bypass the capitol altogether by filing an initiative “that would reinstate
redevelopment agencies with even broader powers, calling them job and
education development agencies.” 433 Whatever the method or form of
reestablishment, it is clear that California wants urban renewal back.434

426. See Development Agreement, supra note 391, at 10 (requiring the URA to “obtain all zoning changes, conditional use permits, variances and exceptions, and similar permits and approvals from the City of Twin Falls” that were required to construct plant).
427. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 422, at 19.
428. See Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 96.
429. Supra Part I; Walters, supra note 12.
430. Walters, supra note 12.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. See id.
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Similar to California, one Idaho community, Nampa, has had a
fickle relationship with urban renewal. In 2004, the city disbanded its
URA through an advisory vote.435 Just two years later, the city had created a new URA.436 Recently, the city has sought to reduce the role of
urban renewal within its jurisdiction without actually eliminating its
URA. The city elected four new city council members in November
2013.437 The new six-member city council consisted primarily of members who were opposed to urban renewal.438 With the new city council in
place, it voted to replace Nampa’s URA board with the council itself.439
This unprecedented move was taken to give the council “more control
over which projects move forward.”440 However, considering most of the
council members’ opposition to urban renewal, it is questionable whether any substantial progress will be made on current and future projects.
Although the council claims to be providing voter accountability for the
URA, 441 the change in administration seems more like a makeshift
mechanism for severely limiting urban renewal in Nampa without eliminating it completely.
Efforts such as the Nampa City Council’s seem redundant considering California’s and Nampa’s histories with urban renewal. These examples show that even those who criticize urban renewal find that it is
hard to live without once it is gone.442 This is not only because urban
renewal fits so well with prominent features of contemporary local government but also because the benefits that urban renewal provides,
though seemingly intangible while urban renewal exists, become much
more tangible once it is gone. The Idaho Supreme Court and legislature
have recognized these benefits by upholding the constitutional and statutory legality of urban renewal.443 Thus, even though highly conservative local leaders and urban renewal critics may take drastic measures
to resist urban renewal, as long as it keeps providing these benefits to
Idaho communities, their efforts will be ineffectual.
This is not to say that urban renewal does not have shortcomings.
As this article points out, urban renewal has a turbulent past and there
are inherent aspects of modern urban renewal that cause it to succeed
435. Rebecca Meany, Urban Renewal Agency Requires Specific Plans, IDAHO
MOUNTAIN
EXPRESS
&
GUIDE,
April
12,
2006,
http://www.mtexpress.com/index2.php?ID=2005109261&var_Year=2006&var_Month=04&va
r_Day=12#.U2WVu15T5-w.
436. Nampa Development Corporation, supra note 8.
437. John Funk, Four New Nampa City Council Members Will Join White, Kren,
IDAHO PRESS-TRIB., Nov. 6, 2013, http://www.idahopress.com/members/four-new-nampa-citycouncil-members-will-join-white-kren/article_61425ea8-46c0-11e3-b27c-0019bb2963f4.html.
438. See John Funk, Nampa Votes to Dissolve NDC Board, IDAHO PRESS-TRIB., Feb.
19,
2014,
http://www.idahopress.com/members/nampa-votes-to-dissolve-ndcboard/article_8d322ea8-9931-11e3-891c-001a4bcf887a.html.
439. Id.
440. See Nampa Council Discusses Future of NDC Board, supra note 14.
441. Id.
442. Walters, supra note 12.
443. Supra Part II.
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while simultaneously creating tension in local politics and economics.444
The way to mitigate these shortcomings, however, is not the elimination
or severe limitation of urban renewal, but the fostering of a climate in
which urban renewal can realize its full potential. Idaho can foster such
a climate by shedding negative associations with urban renewal’s troubled past, recognizing the evolution and beneficial aspects of Idaho’s
current system, and making efforts to incrementally improve that system going forward.
Spencer W. Holm*

444. Supra Parts I, III.
* The author would like to thank Meghan Conrad, Ryan Armbruster, Melinda
Anderson, Professor Stephen Miller, the University of Idaho law librarians, the Idaho Law
Review, and his wonderful wife, Rachel, for accommodating the publication of this article.
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V. APPENDIX: The Evolution of Urban Renewal in Idaho*
1965i
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✓
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URA authorization by voters
PLAN FORMULATION
Legal Requirements
Blight finding
Explicit “but for” requirement
Plan Requirements
Conformance with comprehensive plan
Specific planned uses
Project costs
Community benefit agreements
Additional requirements
PLAN ADOPTION
Hearings Required
At plan adoption
At plan amendment
At district creation
Additional Participatory Mechanisms
Transmit plan description to taxing entities
Consult with citizens’ council &/or taxing entities
PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
Tax Increment Management
Return of excess revenues after 20+ years
Return mandated when plan terminated
Losses in initial stages reimbursed
Partial school district exemption
EVALUATION
Regular evaluation during project
Transparency
TERMINATION
Time limits
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APPENDIX: The Evolution of Urban Renewal in Idaho (continued)
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✓
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✓


✓


✓
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✓
✓
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✓
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✓
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✓xxv
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Suggested

This table is based largely on the table that Johnson and Kriz used in their
*
2001 publication that surveyed TIF laws across the United States. Johnson & Kriz, supra
note 3, at 33–35 tbl. 3.1, 45–47 tbl. 3.2.
i.
Title 50, chapter 20 enacted. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 246, sec.
1, § 50-2001, 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 600.
ii.
Title 50, chapter 29 enacted. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 1,
§ 50-2901, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 393.
iii.
(e) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local Economic Development Act, ch. 381, sec. 2, § 50-2903(7), 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1222, 1224
(codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (adding competitively disadvantaged border areas).
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iv.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(a) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
v.
Agricultural land exempted from IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 &
Supp. 2013). Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 310, sec. 1, § 50-2018(8), 2006 Idaho
Sess. Laws 953, 953–54 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 &
Supp. 2013)).
vi.
Forestland exempted from IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp.
2013). Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 4, § 50-2018(8), 2011 Idaho Sess.
Laws 910, 916 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp.
2013)). (f) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local Economic
Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 6, § 50-2903(8), 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 920 (codified as
amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (specifying that deterioration does not include areas “not developed beyond agricultural, or any agricultural operation”).
vii. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2018(8), -2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
viii. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2008(b), (d), (g), -2009, -2018(12)(g) (2009 & Supp.
2013).
ix.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(2) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
x.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xi.
(7) and (8) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905 (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local
Economic Development Act, ch. 143, sec. 4, § 50-2905(6), (7), 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws 394,
401 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(7), (8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (requiring a termination date (7) and “[a] description of the disposition or retention of any
assets of the agency upon the termination date.” (8)).
xii. (1) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905 (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local Economic
Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 8, § 50-2905(1), 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 923 (codified as
amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (requiring a statement
describing the value of the taxable property in the TIF district and in the municipality).
xiii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(1), (3), (5)–(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xiv. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(c) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xv. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2906(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xvi. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(c) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xvii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2907 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xviii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904(5) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xix. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2909(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xx. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2908(1)(f) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xxi. (c) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006 (2009 & Supp. 2013). Idaho Urban
Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 1, § 50-2006(c), 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 912 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(c) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (requiring a public meeting to present yearly report).
xxii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(c), (e) (2009 & Supp. 2013).
xxiii. 24-year time limit added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
Local Economic Development Act, ch. 275, sec. 2, § 50-2904, 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 893,
896–97 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
xxiv. 24-year time limit changed to 20-year time limit. Local Economic Development
Act, ch. 317, sec. 7, § 50-2904, 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 923 (codified as amended at
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013)).
xxv. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013).

